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1. Should the Court’s removal of child pornography from the protection of the First 
Amendment include virtual child pornography?
2. Under the strict scrutiny standard for content-specific restrictions on speech, is the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act narrowly tailored to effectuate compelling governmental 
interests?
3. Does application of the Child Pornography Prevention Act impermissibly extend into 
protected speech?
4. Do the contested provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act put a reasonable 
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BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and the United States Government, 
respectfully submit this brief and request that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the United 




The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 198 
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This case involves the First Amendment to the Constitution, which provides in relevant part 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U S. Const, amend. 1.
This case also involves the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides in 
relevant part that “[n]o person . . . shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” U S. Const, amend. V.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutes relevant to the disposition of this case are 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and 2256 (West
2000).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Challenges to the constitutionality of a federal statute are reviewed de novo. McNarv v. 
Haitian Refiieee Ctr.. Inc.. 498 U S. 479, 493 (1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1997, Respondents filed suit in the Northern District of California, seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief by a pre-enforcement challenge to certain provisions of the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”). (J. A. 1-2.) Respondents consist of a trade 
association that calls itself “The Free Speech Coalition,” a group representing businesses and 
individuals involved in the production, distribution, sale, and presentation of adult pornography; 
Bold Type, Inc., a publisher of a book about nudism; and individual artists whose works include 
nude and sexually explicit photographs and paintings. (J.A. 2-3.) Respondent Jim Gingerich is a 
New York artist whose paintings include large-scale nudes, and Respondent Ron RafFaelli is a
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professional photographer and publisher of sexually explicit materials. (J.A. 2-3 .) Respondents 
alleged that provisions contained in §§ 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) of the CPPA were vague, 
overbroad, and constituted impermissible content-specific regulations and restraints on free 
speech, in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. (J.A. 4-9.)
The CPPA is Congress’s latest attempt at proscribing child pornography. Congress first 
enacted the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 based on findings that 
child pornography was highly organized, highly profitable, and exploited countless numbers of 
real children in its production. N.Y. v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747, 749 n. 1 (citing Pub. L. No. 95-225 
(1977)). This statute criminalized the sexual exploitation of children under the age of sixteen, 
including the commercial production and distribution of visual depictions of children engaged in 
sexually explicit acts. Sen. Rpt. 95-438, at 5 (1977).
The statute quickly proved to be ineffective in combating child pornography, leading 
Congress to enact the Child Protection Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-292 (1984) Changes from the 
previous statute include raising the protected age group from sixteen to eighteen, dismissing the 
requirement that the production or distribution of child pornography be for the purpose of sale, 
expanding the scope of the statute to include any “visual depiction,” and clarifying that conduct 
under the statute need not rise to the level of the adult obscenity standard. Id^
The integration of computer technology into society motivated further adaptations to child 
pornography law, leading to the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988. Pub. L. 
No. 100-690 (1988). This statute made it unlaAvful to use a computer to transport, distribute, or 
receive child pornography. Id Federal law was further amended to punish any production or 
importation of sexually explicit depictions of a minor. Id
Despite Congress’s attempts, the child pornography market flourished. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, 
at 5 (Aug. 2, 1996). Rapid advances in computer technologies allowed producers and distributors
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of child pornography to circumvent existing laws. Id at 7. In its findings. Congress emphasized 
that all forms of child pornography “present a clear and present danger to all children.” Id at 2. 
Consequently, the CPPA expanded the scope of protection by criminalizing the use of computer 
technology to produce pornography containing images of a subject who “appears to be” or coveys 
the impression” of a minor engaging in “sexually explicit conduct.” Id at 15; 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) (2000).
The definition of child pornography now includes “any photography, film, video, picture, 
or computer or computer-generated image or picture” where
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be. of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an 
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or 
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or 
contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (emphasis added). To obtain a conviction, the government must prove that
the accused “knowingly” violated the terms of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (“scienter
requirement”).
The CPPA provides an affirmative defense for violations of its terms if
(1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or persons 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was produced; and
(3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or distribute, the 
material in such a manner as to convey the impression that it is or contains a 
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
18 U.S C. § 2252A(c) (“affirmative defense”). An individual who is charged with the mere
possession of child pornography may bring an alternative affirmative defense if the individual
(1) possessed less than three images of child pornography;
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(2) promptly and in good faith, and without retaining or allowing any person, any 
other than a law enforcement agency, to access any image or copy thereof-
(A) took reasonable steps to destroy such image, or
(B) reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency 
access to each such image.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (“safe-harbor provision”).
Respondents brought suit claiming that the contested provisions, “appears to be” and 
“conveys the impression,” rendered application of the CPPA unconstitutional and facially invalid. 
(J.A. 1-8.) Both parties moved for summary judgment. (J.A. 16,73.) The district court granted 
the government’s motion for summary judgment while denying Respondents’ cross-motion for 
summary judgment. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12212 at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 12, 1997). The district court found the CPPA constitutional under an intermediate 
scrutiny standard for content-neutral speech. Id The district court also found that the contested 
provisions were neither vague nor overbroad and did not constitute an improper prior restraint of 
speech. Id
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno. 198F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Rejecting the 
district court’s characterization of the CPPA as a content-neutral regulation, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the CPPA was a content-specific regulation of speech. Id The court then concluded that 
under the strict scrutiny standard for content-specific regulations of speech, the CPPA was 
unconstitutional because it did not advance a compelling governmental interest.’ Id The court 
also held that the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” were unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad. Id (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(B), 2256(8)(D)). These provisions were 
severed from the statute, while the rest of the CPPA remained enforceable. Id
* Because the Ninth Circuit held that the CPPA did not advance a compelling governmental 
interest, the court declined to rule on whether the CPPA was narrowly tailored to effectuate its 
purpose. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999)
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This Court granted certiorari on January 22, 2001. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 121
S. Ct. 876 (2001).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should hold that the contested provisions of the CPPA, “appears to be” and 
“conveys the impression,” do not render the statute unconstitutional. Rather, the CPPA 
permissibly criminalizes the creation, distribution, and possession of all child pornography, 
including virtual child pornography.
Virtual child pornography should be classified as a category of unprotected speech. The 
expressive interest in protecting virtual child pornography is de minimis. That interest is 
substantially outweighed by the government’s compelling need to protect children. The very 
interests that justified removing “actual” child pornography from constitutional protection are 
likewise implicated by virtual child pornography. Furthermore, the CPPA is a reasonable response 
to computer technologies that child pornographers now use to circumvent existing laws. Virtual 
child pornography is child pornography and should therefore be without constitutional protection.
Even if virtual child pornography is a distinct category of protected speech, the CPPA 
permissibly regulates virtual child pornography. As a content-specific regulation on speech, the 
CPPA survives strict scrutiny as it is narrowly tailored to advance compelling governmental 
interests.
Congress recognized the link between virtual child pornography and harms inflicted on 
children. First, by helping the child pornography market thrive and by perpetuating the 
sexualization of children, virtual child pornography poses a clear and present danger to children 
generally. Second, virtual child pornography is used as a weapon against children. It stimulates 
the appetites of sexual predators who use child pornography to seduce their victims. Third, 
without proscribing virtual child pornography, actual children depicted in child pornography
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remain unprotected. Although virtual child pornography, in its final form, contains no identifiable 
children, there is no assurance that actual children were not involved in its creation. Additionally, 
accused child pornographers will have a built in reasonable doubt argument that the work, which is 
indistinguishable from “actual” child pornography, is really virtual child pornography.
The CPPA is the least restrictive means of combating these harms. The statute provides 
statutory safeguards - an affirmative defense, a safe harbor provision, and a scienter requirement - 
that limit the scope of its application. Furthermore, without the challenged provisions, the 
government will be unable to meet its burden in proving that a depiction contains actual children. 
By removing this built-in reasonable doubt argument, the CPPA targets activity that its enactment 
was meant to prevent.
Furthermore, application of the CPPA will not extend into protected speech. The CPPA’s 
statutory safeguards preclude conviction for creating, distributing, and possessing non-obscene 
adult pornography. Works that are not considered child pornography and are thus protected under 
the Constitution, such as cartoons, drawings, and paintings, are not criminalized by the CPPA. 
Congress intended the contested provisions to apply only to those depictions that are “virtually 
indistinguishable” from “actual” child pornography. The statute should therefore be interpreted to 
avoid the constitutional problem and to further congressional intent.
The CPPA is not void for vagueness because it provides adequate notice and discourages 
arbitrary enforcement of its provisions. Although the statute does demand qualitative evaluations, 
a reasonable person is expected to exercise the type of discretion that the CPPA requires. The 
scienter requirement, by connoting an objective standard, mitigates the statute’s vagueness. This 
ensures that law enforcement officials will be focused on the most compelling problem, 
eradicating pre-pubescent child pornography. For the above reasons, the Court should hold the 
contested provisions of the CPPA constitutional.
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I VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY. LIKE ALL FORMS OF CHILD
P^OGRAPHY, IS UNWORTHY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION.
The Constitution provides in relevant part that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const, amend. 1, The First Amendment protects the right of the 
people to discuss openly, without fear of liability or censorship, any matter of public concern. 
Thornhill V Ala.. 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). By assuring the “unfettered interchange of ideas,” the 
First Amendment helps bring about the political and social changes desired by the people Roth v.
U.S.. 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
There are, however, “certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.” Chaplinskv v. N.H.. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). These include obscenity, libel, 
profanity, and “fighting words.” Id (citations omitted) This Court explained that “such 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.” Id
Child pornography is a category of unprotected speech. NY. v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747, 764 
(1982). In Ferber. the Court considered the constitutionality of a state statute that banned the 
advertising of sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen. Id at 749 The issue 
before the Court was whether the constitutionality of the statute should be judged under the 
obscenity standard. Id at 756 (citing Miller v. Cal.. 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973)). The Court concluded 
that obscenity was an inappropriate standard to resolve this question because states have greater 
leeway in regulating the protection of children. Id at 764. Instead, the Court announced a new 
category of unprotected speech: child pornography. Id at 756-64. So long as the scope of the
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statute was adequately defined, limited to visual depictions, and applied to children, the proscribed 
conduct need not have risen to the level of obscenity. Id at 764. Thus, the Court held that the 
statute, by prohibiting the advertising and distribution of child pornography, did not implicate the 
First Amendment because it proscribed unprotected speech. Id; see, e.g.. Osborne v, Ohio. 495 
U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (holding that Ohio statute permissibly criminalized possession of child 
pornography).
Although unforeseen when Ferber and Osborne were decided, technology has now 
advanced to the point where casual computer users can create virtual child pornography that is 
“virtually indistinguishable” from “actual” child pornography. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 15. The 
difference between “actual” and virtual child pornography is not that virtual pornography does not 
contain actual children, but that it its final form it does not contain identifiable children. 18 U.S.C 
§ 2256(8)(C)
This is a distinction without a difference. Child pornography is not transformed into 
something meaningful because it is virtual and not “actual.” Virtual child pornography is as 
removed from the “unfettered interchange of ideas” as libel, obscenity, fighting words, and 
“actual” child pornography. ^ Roth. 354 U S. at 484. Respondents never argue otherwise. 
Nevertheless, Respondents invite this Court to place virtual child pornography within the 
protection of the First Amendment. Petitioners respectfully ask this Court to decline.
A. The Government’s Compelling Need to Protect Children Overwhelmingly
Outweigh.s the Minimal Expressive Interest in Protecting Virtual Child
Pornography
The Court places a category of speech outside the protection of the First Amendment where 
“the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, 
that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.” Ferber. 458 U.S. at 763-64 (child 
pornography), Beauharnais v. 111.. 343 U.S. 250, 255 (1952) (libel); Miller. 413 U S. at 23
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(obscenity); Chaplinskv. 315 U S. at 572 (fighting words); see also Free Speech Coalition v. Reno. 
198 F.3d 1083, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Ninth Circuit 
incorrectly declined to apply the balancing test in Ferber to virtual child pornography and therefore 
erroneously concluded that virtual child pornography deserved First Amendment protection). Just 
as child pornography is unprotected by the First Amendment, Ferber. 458 U.S, at 736, the balance 
of interests requires that virtual child pornography, a form of child pornography, should be without 
the protection of the First Amendment.
1. Virtual child pornography is utterly without redeeming social importance.
It is a well established principle of First Amendment jurisprudence that “[a]ll ideas having 
even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas 
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full protection of the [Constitution’s] 
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important 
interests ” Roth. 354 U.S. at 484. But the Constitution need not protect a category of speech that 
is “utterly without redeeming social importance.” Id
Respondents claim that virtual child pornography deserves constitutional protection, yet 
never offer an argument that even a de minimis interest exists in its protection. This Court and 
Congress have recognized the lack of social worth in visual depictions of minors. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
at 762; Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 12-13. Even portrayed in the most forgiving light, the purpose of 
child pornography is clear: to titillate pedophiles. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 12-13. Its effects are 
clear: to objectify and to sexualize children. Id Society has no interest in fulfilling this purpose or 
creating these effects. It is irrelevant as a “step to truth.” Chaplinksv. 315 U S at 572. Nothing
^ This Court long ago rejected the need to satisfy the “utterly without redeeming social 
importance” standard to prove obscenity. Miller. 413 U.S. at 22. Given the high burden on the 
prosecution in our criminal system, proving this standard was impracticable. Id Child 
pornography, virtual or “actual,” satisfies this impermissibly high standard.
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about child pornography, virtual or “actual,” is worth protecting. Respondents’ silence on this 
point speaks volumes.
2. The same interests that justified removing “actual” child pornography from
the rubric of First Amendment protection are implicated bv virtual child
pornography.
The mere absence of social worth does not justify removing a category of speech from the 
protection of the First Amendment. ^ Cal, v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1972). However 
lacking in value speech may be, the government must still demonstrate a substantial interest in 
proscribing that speech. ^ Id In Ferber. the Court outlined interests that justified removal of child 
pornography from constitutional protection. 453 U.S. at 736. Many of these dealt with the most 
blatant harm: the use of children as subjects of sexual performances. Id at 757. The Court, 
however, also identified the interests in eliminating the entire network for child pornography and 
removing the economic incentive for the market. Id at 761-62.
The Court later extended the scope of child pornography regulation by upholding a state 
statute that criminalized mere possession. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110. Citing the same rationales as 
Ferber. the Osborne Court also accepted two important new reasons: child pornography whets the 
appetites of child molesters and is used as means of seducing children. Id at 110. The Court 
recognized that the mere possession of child pornography entails a danger to children that is not 
implicated by advertising and distribution. Id
Citing Ferber and Osborne. Congress included the above rationales in its congressional 
findings for the CPPA. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 13-15. Congress also identified new interests,
^ Several of these interests will be discussed in more detml below in § II.A, where they are 
explained in the context of the compelling governmental interests required to satisfy the strict- 
scrutiny standard for content-specific regulations of protected speech. Here, they indicate that the 
same interests that justified placing child pornography outside the protection of the First 
Amendment apply to virtual child pornography, i.e., virtual child pornography is child 
pornography and should therefore be considered unprotected speech. To the extent that these are 
discussed in more detail in the later section, the same explanations are relevant here.
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including the use of computers to: (1) create images “virtually indistinguishable” from “actual” 
child pornography; (2) satisfy the particular perversions of pedophiles; and (3) alter innocent 
images of children into child pornography. Id at 2. Furthermore, the eroticization of children has 
a deleterious effect on all children and creates an unwholesome environment that undermines the 
efforts of parents and families to encourage the sound mental, moral, and emotional development 
of children. Id.
Given the above compelling governmental interests, the difference between virtual and 
“actual” child pornography is illusory. Both virtual and “actual” child pornography:
• are used as tools of seduction
• whet the appetites of child molesters
• fuel the existence of the entire child pornography market
• sexualize children
• undermine the efforts of parents in creating a healthy environment for their 
children.
These interests, without reference to the children contained in “actual” child pornography, justify 
upholding the CPPA. ^
Even more striking is the fact that without the CPPA, these same children are exposed to 
the very harms that the statutes upheld in Ferber and Osborne were meant to prevent. There is no 
guarantee that virtual child pornography is either completely virtual or made with adults who look 
like children. Absent prosecution under statutes like the CPPA, a child molester is invited to 
sexually exploit a young child, record the event, touch up the image with the help of his computer 
so the child is unidentifiable, and pass it off as virtual child pornography. The visual depiction 
itself will give no clue as to the identity of the child or the occurrence of the crime.
^ It is quite telling that previous child pornography statutes criminalized the importation of child 
pornography, suggesting that its use and possession, and not merely its creation (which in the case 
of importation is outside the jurisdiction of the United States government) justified placing it 
outside the protection of the First Amendment.
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If the government is to have any chance at eliminating the abuse of children used in 
“actual” child pornography, virtual child pornography cannot be protected. In their final forms, 
virtual and “actual” child pornography are indistinguishable. This provides the accused with a 
convenient loophole. The prosecution will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
image is actual and not virtual. Thus, prosecutorial necessity requires removing from the 
protection of the Constitution those images that are “virtually indistinguishable” from “actual” 
child pornography.
Even if Respondents are correct in identifying as dispositive the interest in protecting the 
child subjects of “actual” child pornography, virtual child pornography exposes these very children 
to devastating and foreseeable harm. Successful prosecution of those who inflict such harm will 
be unduly burdensome absent the criminalization of virtual child pornography.
B. Because the CPPA Was Created in Response to New Technologies. It Properly
Includes Virtual Child Pornography Within the Definition of Child Pornography.
It is not unusual for this Court to reevaluate an issue in light of new technology. Katz 
v. U.S.. 389 U S. 347, 352 (1967). In Katz, advances in electronic surveillance equipment 
compelled the Court to reexamine what constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
The prosecution argued that because the equipment at issue did not invade a “constitutionally 
protected area,” a search did not occur in a phone booth. Id at 349. In rejecting this argument, the 
Court adapted its definition of a search to the realities of its day. Although there was no physical 
invasion of a protected area, a search occurred because the equipment at issue violated the 
defendant’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the phone booth. Id at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). This understanding of a search thus protected the same interests that previous law 
was intended, but no longer able, to protect.
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Here, the Court confronts a situation analogous to Katz. Respondents argue that previous 
law under Ferber and Osborne does not apply to virtual child pornography. What goes 
unrecognized, however, is that virtual and "actual” child pornography implicate the same 
compelling interests in substantially similar ways. The definition of child pornography should be 
adapted to included virtual child pornography so as to effectuate these interests.
Child pornography legislation is particularly problematic because child pornographers have 
shown a remarkable ability to adapt to laws intended to abolish child pornography. Sen. Rpt. 104- 
358, at 26. When child pornography was forced underground after Ferber. “clandestine networks” 
were quickly formed to produce and trade the illegal material. Id When liability under early 
statutes required that production or distribution be for sale, pornography trafficking became a 
largely non-profit network. Id The Child Protection Act of 1984 was amended to do away with 
the profit requirement. Id To further reach the underground networks the Court upheld a statute 
that criminalized mere possession. Osborne, 495 U S. at 110
Pornographers then began distributing pictures of scantily-clad girls striking provocative 
poses under the assumption that "lascivious” required a showing of actual nudity. U.S. v. Knnv 
32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1109(1995). The definition of “lascivious” was 
extended to capture any display intended to draw attention to a child's genital areas. Id at 745-46 
While there are many of these examples, the essence of the problem is the same: the law changes, 
and the child pornographer adapts. Virtual child pornography is merely the latest instance of this 
phenomenon.
Any argument that Ferber and Osborne necessarily limit the scope of permissible child 
pornography legislation to actual child pornography ignores the realities of our jurisprudence 
and the problems that virtual child pornography pose. The government maintains compelling 
interests in destroying the child pornography market, protecting children who would be seduced.
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preventing incitement of child molesters, preventing the sexualization of children, creating a 
wholesome environment for children, and protecting children involved in the production of 
pornography. Virtual child pornography, as much as “actual” child pornography, implicates each 
of these interests. Only by proscribing virtual child pornography can the government effectuate 
theses interests. Virtual child pornography is child pornography. It should not be protected under 
our Constitution.
11. EVEN IF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IS A DISTINCT CATEGORY OF
PROTECTED SPEECH, THE CPPA NEVERTHELESS PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL
MUSTER UNDER A STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD.
A content-based restriction on speech is subject to strict scrutiny. Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism. 491 U S. 781, 791 (1992). To survive strict scrutiny,^ the CPPA must advance compelling 
governmental interests and be narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest. U.S. v. Playboy Ent. 
Group. Inc.. 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). The constitutionality of the CPPA must be examined in the 
context of Congress’s power to regulate child pornography. U S. v. Acheson. 195 F.3d 645, 650 
(11th Cir. 1999). Although content-based regulations are presumptively invalid because of the risk 
of suppressing protected expression, Congress has greater leeway in regulating child pornography. 
Ferber. 458 U.S. at 756. The CPPA survives constitutional scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored 
to advance compelling governmental interests.
A. The CPPA Advances the Government’s Compelling Interest in Protecting Children
From the Evils of Child Pornography.
The Supreme Court recognized the government’s compelling interest in protecting children 
from harm. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 756-57. Specifically, the prevention of sexual exploitation and 
abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance. Ferber 458 U.S. at
^ The district court found that the CPPA was a content-neutral restriction on speech. Free Speech 
Coalition v. Reno. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12212 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1997). Content-neutral 
restrictions are evaluated under an intermediate-scrutiny standard. Id For the purposes of 
argument. Petitioners concede that the CPPA is a content-specific restriction.
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757. The CPPA protects children from sexual abuse and exploitation resulting from the multiple 
nefarious uses of virtual child pornography.
This Court has mandated that flexibility be reserved in combating child pornography.
Ferber 458 U.S. at 756. In Ferben this Court enumerated five reasons why the government is 
“entitled to greater leeway” in the regulation of child pornographic materials. Id First, the Court 
found manifest the compelling nature of a state’s interest in safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being of a minor by preventing the use of children as subjects of pornographic 
materials. Id at 756-57. Second, recognizing the direct link between the sexual abuse of children 
and the promotion of child pornography, the Court held that the obscenity standard as set forth in 
Miller bore no connection to the harm suffered by children in the production of pornographic 
materials. Id at 761. Third, the Court recognized that the promotion of child pornography is 
indispensable to the economic viability of the illegal child pornography industry. Id Fourth, the 
Court noted the de minimis value of child pornography. Id at 762. Finally, the Court held that 
placing child pornography outside the rubric of the First Amendment did not conflict with 
precedent. Id at 763-64.
Respondents read this Court’s holding in Ferber too narrowly. First, preventing harm to 
depicted children was not the only legitimate justification for banning child pornography. Second, 
Ferber focused on “actual” child pornography because virtual child pornography had yet to 
become an issue. Id at 747. Ferber does not stand for the proposition that legitimate regulation of 
child pornography would be forever restricted to “actual” child pornography.
On the contrary, the Court broadened its child pornography jurisprudence by recognizing 
that protecting children who are not actually pictured in the pornographic images is a compelling 
state interest. Osborne, 495 U.S at 111. In Osborne, this Court upheld the constitutionally of an 
Ohio statute banning the possession of child pornography. Id at 111. The statute legitimately
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proscribed mere possession not because it was aimed at controlling a person’s private thoughts, but 
rather to protect victims of child pornography and to destroy a market for the exploitative use of 
children. Id at 109. The Court relied not only on the harm suffered by real children used in the 
production of child pornography, but also on the harm suffered by children when pornographic 
materials are used to coerce them into sexual activity. Id at 111. This conclusion marked a subtle, 
yet crucial, extension of the government’s legitimate interest in protecting those children against 
whom child pornography is used as a weapon.
Congress designed and implemented the CPPA to serve the compelling governmental 
interests underscored in Ferber and Osborne. Computer-generated child pornography inflicts 
many of the same harms on children as “actual” child pornography. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 15-20. 
By criminalizing all child pornography, the CPPA legitimately aims to: (1) prevent the incitement 
of child molesters; (2) destroy the network and market for child pornography; (3) prevent the 
coercion of children into sexual activity; (4) solve the prosecutorial problems manifested by virtual 
child pornography; and (5) prevent the sexualization of children. U.S. v. Memo. 231 F.3d 912, 
918-19 (4th Cir. 2000^1 (citing U.S. v. Hilton. 167 F.3d 61, 66-67 (1st Cir. 1999)).
Respondents contend that the government has failed to prove a nexus between virtual child 
pornography and the harm suffered by children. In addition to Supreme Court precedent. Congress 
included in its legislative findings testimonies and studies by expert witnesses and professionals 
corroborating the deleterious effects of virtual child pornography. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 12-19. 
These findings must be afforded substantial deference. Turner Broad. Svs.. Inc, v. Commun, 
Commn.. 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1995). Congress is “better equipped than the judiciary to amass and 
evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon an issue as complex and dynamic as” child 
pornography. Id at 665-66 (citations omitted). As such, this Court should defer to the evidence
17
developed by Congress with regard to the inexorable connection between virtual child 
pornography and child abuse.
Based principally on Congress's legislative findings, four circuit courts held that the CPPA 
advances governmental interests of surpassing importance. U.S. v. Fox. 248 F.3d 394, 400-02 (5th 
Cir. 2001); Mento, 231 F.3d at 920; Acheson. 195 F.3d at 650; Hilton. 167 F.3d at 73. In Fw, the 
Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that preventing harm to children 
actually depicted in pornography is the only legitimate justification for criminalizing the 
possession of child pornography. 248 F.3d at 401. The Fifth Circuit held that the government’s 
interest in protecting children from the harmful effects of virtual child pornography is compelling.
Id at 402; Mento, 231 F.3d at 920 (holding that the government has an interest in “shielding all 
children from sexual exploitation resulting from child pornography”). The court reasoned that 
even when children are not exploited in the actual production of pornography, the collateral effects 
on those children viewing such materials and on society as a whole are devastating and 
permanently damaging. Id
The Fourth Circuit echoed the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in holding that the government has 
a compelling interest in shielding children from sexual exploitation resulting from child 
pornography. Mento, F.3d at 920. The court reasoned that the government should be granted 
greater flexibility in dealing with the technological advances that have spurred the growth of the 
child pornography market. Id Of the five circuit courts that have confi'onted this issue, the Ninth 
Circuit stands alone in rejecting the government’s compelling interest in protecting children from 
virtual child pornography.
The CPPA, by criminalizing virtual child pornography, protects children from three general 
types of harm. First, virtual child pornography fosters the sexual objectification of children.
Second, virtual child pornography stimulates child molesters, who in turn use the pornography to
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seduce child victims. Third, without criminalizing virtual child pornography, real children 
involved in the production of pornographic materials remain unprotected.
1. Virtual child pornography poses a clear and present danger to all children.
The strict regulation of child pornography underscores the fact that “[a] democratic society 
rests, for its continuance, upon the health, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity 
as citizens.” Prince v. Mass.. 321 U.S. 159, 168 (1944). Child pornography is a particularly 
pernicious evil because it abuses, degrades, and exploits children, the weakest and most vulnerable 
members of society. In poisoning the minds and spirits of our youth, it debases society as a whole. 
Sen. Rpt. 104-358. at 12.
The use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, 
emotional, and mental health of children. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. First, sexually exploited 
children suffer from sexual dysfunctions, are unable to develop healthy sexual relationships as 
adults, and have a tendency to become sexual abusers themselves. Id at n. 9. Second, without 
criminalizing virtual child pornography, child pornography fosters a dangerous and unwholesome 
environment for our children. As children become increasingly objectified, society becomes 
desensitized to the profound harms suffered by the victims of child sexual abuse. Society thus fails 
in its duty to ensure the “well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.” 
Prince. 321 U.S. at 168.
The effects of virtual child pornography where there is no identifiable child in the image 
are equally, if not more devastating to the health and well-being of children. Virtual child 
pornography poses the same risks and dangers as “actual” child pornography because it plays a 
critical role in the vicious cycle of child sexual abuse and exploitation. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 13- 
14. Pornographic images depicting actors who merely appear to be children appeal to the prurient 
interests of pedophiles and child molesters regardless of whether or not the image of the child is
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real. Real children who are forced to watch sexually explicit materials are negatively impacted 
and permanently scarred because the perception is that the images portray real children.
Virtual child pornography also poses a danger to children because it fuels the illicit child 
pornography industry. Pornography, including child pornography, is an $8 to $10 billion a year 
business and is organized crime’s third biggest money-maker, after drugs and gambling. Sen. Rpt. 
104-358, at 12. The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for 
and thus play an integral part in the production of such materials. Ferber 458 U S. at 747.
The increased use of computer technology to create virtual child pornography threatens to 
dramatically enlarge the distribution network for child pornography. Id^ Pornographic images are 
often bought, sold, or traded in the same manner as images created through the use of real children. 
Hilton, 167 F.3d at 66. Therefore, criminals who trade and sell images that are indistinguishable 
from those of actual children engaged in sexual activity keep the child pornography market 
thriving as child pomographers find ways to circumvent existing laws. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 19- 
20.
The CPPA is an essential tool for the government to destroy the child pornography market. 
The CPPA bans the possession and distribution of virtual child pornography, decreasing the 
production of child pornography, thereby decreasing the demand. Osborne. 495 U.S. at 109-10. 
Distributors of child pornography will be unable to fuel the perverse sexual appetites of pedophiles 
with virtual child pornography without being subject to the full condemnation of the law. The 
CPPA protects our children from the dangers posed by virtual child pornography.
Virtual child pornography is a tool of incitement for child molesters and a
tool of seduction for child victims.
This Court recognized the link between child pornography and the coercion of children into 
sexual activity by upholding a state statute that criminalized possession of child pornography.
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Osborne. 495 U.S. at 108. The Court distinguished Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969), 
where a Georgia law criminalizing possession of obscene materials was struck down because the 
government maintained no paternalistic interest in regulating thoughts, Osborne. 495 U.S. at 108. 
In contrast to obscenity, the Osborne Court accepted that regulating possession of child 
pornography was not for the purpose of regulating thoughts, but was aimed mainly at decreasing 
the exploitative use of children. 495 U.S. at 109. The Court recognized that possession of child 
pornography poses dangers that possession of obscene materials does not. Criminalizing 
possession of child pornography decreases the ability of child molesters to abuse children because, 
as the Court noted, child pornography whets the appetites of child molesters and is used as a tool 
for seducing children. Id at 109-10.
Insofar as it is “virtually indistinguishable” from “actual” child pornography, virtual child 
pornography is an equally effective tool of seduction. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 15. Evenifthe 
pornography is completely virtual, children are subject to the same attendant harms. Id Thus, 
proscribing possession of virtual child pornography is a compelling state interest.
When child pornography is employed to seduce or break down a child’s inhibitions, the 
images are equally as effective regardless of whether they are real photographs or computer­
generated pictures. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 15-17. A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual 
activity with an adult may be convinced by viewing depictions of other children participating in 
such activity. Children are in as great a danger of being coerced and abused with virtual child 
pornography as with “actual” child pornography. It makes no difference to the children coerced 
into sexual activity or to the adult who uses such materials to seduce children whether the subjects 
depicted are actual children or computer simulations. Id.
Experts have described how child molesters use virtual child pornography to perpetuate a 
cycle of abuse and exploitation in the same fashion these offenders use “actual” child pornography
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to seduce children. This cycle consists of the following stages: (1) showing child pornography to a 
child for “educational purposes;” (2) attempting to convince a child that sex is acceptable, even 
desirable; (3) convincing the child that other children are sexually active and that such conduct is 
enjoyable; (4) desensitizing the child and lowering his inhibitions; (5) engaging the child in sexual 
activity; (6) photographing such sexual activity, and (7) using the result child pornography to 
attract yet more child victims. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 13 (citation omitted).
Similarly, virtual child pornography is a powerful tool in stimulating the appetites of child 
molesters, leading to further abuse of children. Convicted child molesters have admitted that child 
pornography fueled their salacious desires for young children. For example, Arthur Gary Bishop, 
convicted of sexually abusing and killing five young boys, said “[i]f pornographic material would 
have been unavailable to me in my early states, it is most probable that my sexual activities would 
not have escalated to the degree they did. ... I am a homosexual pedophile convicted of murder, 
and pornography was a determining factor in my downfall.” Atty. Gen. Commn. on Pornography, 
Final Report 604, 629 (1986).
Computer technology also allows creation of pornographic depictions involving children 
designed to satisfy the preferences of individual sexual predators. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 16. Dr. 
Victor Kline testified before Congress that most pedophiles and child molesters have special 
preferences for child pornography with respect to age, physical appearance, and sexual acts or 
poses of depicted minors. Id Thus, a child molester or pedophile can create “custom-tailored” 
pornography through the use of a computer. Id Computer-imaging technology can also be used 
to alter pictures of actual children taken from various sources - books, magazines, catalogs, or 
videos - to create visual depictions of those children engaging in sexual conduct.
The ability to alter pornographic depictions using innocent images of children heightens the 
material's effect on the viewer thereby increasing the threat the material poses to children. Images
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made by manipulating an innocent picture of a real child engaged in sexually lascivious conduct 
can also be used to blackmail that child into submitting to abuse and remaining silent about it. It 
may also be possible for child pornographers to surreptitiously take a photograph of a child and 
later alter that image into a sexually explicit depiction. Id at 16. This use of technology to create 
child pomographer harms the child’s privacy, reputation, and psyche to the same extent as if the 
child were actually involved in its production. Id
Virtual and “actual” child pornography are equally potent. Each stimulates the perverse 
desires of child molesters and each is used to exploit child viaims. For these purposes, 
criminalizing “actual” child pornography is a compelling state interest. The CPPA carries out 
these interests by criminalizing all forms of child pornography.
3. Without criminalizing virtual child pornography, children involved in the
production of “actual” child pornography remain unprotected
As computer-imaging technology advances, it becomes increasingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to distinguish between virtual and “actual” child pornography. Without criminalizing 
virtual child pornography, two problems arise. First, there is no way to prove that in its creation, 
virtual child pornography did not utilize actual children. Second, an accused child pomographer 
will have a built-in reasonable doubt defense that the depiction at issue is virtual. The challenged 
provisions of the CPPA solve these problems.
Virtual child pornography does not contain “identifiable” children. 18 U.S.C. § 
2256(8)(C). But it is always possible that actual children were used to create the visual depiction. 
Altering the final image so the child is no longer “identifiable” is simple matter. Sen. Rpt. 104- 
358, at 15-16. As Professor Frederick Shaeuer testified before Congress, it is undoubtedly true 
that somewhere along the chain of computer-generated production of virtual child pornography, 
there are going to be real children involved. Id. at 21.
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Furthermore, the CPPA closes a loophole in the law. The inability to distinguish the real 
from the virtual necessarily creates a reasonable doubt that a picture depicts an actual child.
Unless the government can identify the child, the government will have difficulty in meeting its 
burden. The child pornographer will thus be able to circumvent laws that only criminalize “actual” 
child pornography. The result would be an increase in the sexually abusive and exploitive use of 
children. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 20.
Before the CPPA, technology made it possible for child molesters and pedophiles to escape 
responsibility for violating the existing laws, even when the pictures contained actual children 
being sexually abused and exploited. Id at 16. In light of rapid advances in pornography 
technology, the CPPA bolsters the enforcement of existing laws against the possession and 
distribution of child pornography.
B- The CPPA Is Narrowly Tailored to Protect Children From the Harms Inflicted bv 
Child Pornography
Content-based restrictions on speech must also be narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling governmental interest. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813. Congress may regulate protected 
speech to promote a compelling governmental interest so long as it selects “the least restrictive 
means to further the articulated interest.” Sable Cnmm of Cal.. Inc., v. FCC 492 U.S. 115, 126 
(1989). The issue presented here focuses on the CPPA’s expansive definition of child 
pornography, which includes any visual depiction that “appears to be” or “conveys the impression” 
that it is “of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(B) and 
2256(8)(D). The CPPA survives strict scrutiny because under these terms, it is the least restrictive 
means of combating the latest threat posed by virtual child pornography.
The “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” language of the CPPA addresses the law 
enforcement problem created by the technological advances in computer imaging since Ferbcr and
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Osborne. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 28 (explaining that the contested provisions were added to close a 
loophole in federal child pornography laws caused by advances in computer technology). Prior 
laws required the government to affirmatively show that each piece of child pornography at issue 
was created using an identifiable child. Unfortunately, computer-imaging technology has made it 
virtually impossible for the government to prove that a pornographic image depicts a real child 
being molested and exploited. Sen. Rpt. 104-348, at 20. Without this language, there is always a 
built-in reasonable doubt argument as to the age and authenticity of the participant, unless the 
government can identify the actual child involved. Mento. 213 F.3d at 920. If the identity of the 
actor is unavailable, as is often the case, the “government can prove nothing more than the 
depiction ‘appears to be’ that of a minor.” Id. Consequently, efforts to eradicate the child 
pornography market as whole could be effectively frustrated if Congress were prevented from 
targeting sexually explicit material that “appears to be” of real children. Hilton, 167 F 3d at 73.
The connection between virtual child pornography and the sexual abuse of children is just 
as powerful as the causal link that justified the absolute proscription of “actual” child pornography. 
Fox. 248 F.3d at 403 (holding that sexually explicit images that only appear to be minors can be 
just as effective in coercing children into sexual activity as images of actual children); Mento. 231 
F.3d at 920 (agreeing with Congress that depictions represented to be of minors are harmful in the 
same way as any child pornography). To curb the harms generated by virtual pornography, the 
CPPA extends the existing prohibitions on real child pornography to a narrow class of computer- 
generated pictures easily mistaken for depictions of actual children. Sen. Rpt. 104-3 58, at 21.
The CPPA bans visual depictions that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting 
viewer from un-retouched photographic images of actual children engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct. Id at 16. In this way, the CPPA does not criminalize more constitutional speech than 
necessary. It is the least restrictive means to target harms specific to virtual pornography as well
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as those long acknowledged to result from “actual” child pornography. The statute could not be 
tailored in a less restrictive fashion and still effectuate its goal of eradicating child pornography.
To effectuate its purpose, the CPPA provides an affirmative defense and a safe-harbor 
provision. The statute allows a defendant to claim as an affirmative defense to a charge of 
transporting, receiving, selling, distributing, or reproducing child pornography that the 
pornographic images (1) “[were] produced using an actual person or persons;” (2) each of whom 
was an adult at the time the material was produced;” and (3) “the defendant did not advertise, 
promote, present, describe, or distribute the material in such a marmer as to convey the impression 
that it is or contains visual depictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2253A(c). The statute also provides a safe harbor provision for those individuals possessing 
such images if the defendant (1) possessed fewer than three such images and (2) promptly and in 
good faith destroyed or reported the images to law enforcement. Id § 2252A(d). The statute only 
criminalizes child pornography produced and pandered as such. It does not criminalize conduct 
that meets the elements of these defenses.
The affirmative defense and the safe harbor provision work in conjunction with the scienter 
requirement, which requires the government to prove that the possessor of such images knowingly 
received sexually explicit depictions of minors or those who appear to be minors. Id § 2252A(c). 
The statute’s scienter requirement applies to the age of the persons depicted as well as to the nature 
of the materials. SeeUiLv. X-Citement Video Inc , sn ITS 61, 78-7Qf1QQ4) In effect, the 
scienter requirement limits the scope of the statute because the majority of prosecutions will 
involve images of pre-pubescent children to increase prosecutorial efficiency. Acheson. 195 F.3d 
at 651-52. The First and Fifth Circuits have held that the danger of criminals being convicted 
under the CPPA for possessing pornographic images of adults who look youthful is “overstated” in
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light of the fact that pedophiles have a predilection for pre-pubescent children. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 
73-73; Fox, 248 F.3d at 404-05.
The CPPA is narrowly tailored to ftilfill the needs for prosecutorial efficiency while only 
regulating those materials properly considered child pornography. The CPPA’s inclusion of the 
statutory safeguards and the contested provisions render the CPPA the least restrictive means of 
eliminating the harms resulting from child pornography. This Court should join with the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that “the statutory language . . . cannot be improved 
upon while still achieving the compelling governmental purpose of banning child pornography.” 
Memo. 231 F.3dat 921.
III. THE CPPA IS NOT OVERBROAD BECAUSE APPLICATION OF ITS TERMS wn.T.
NOT EXTEND INTO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH
The general rule is that a statute is overbroad when its applications extend into 
constitutionally protected speech. Broadrick v. Okla.. 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). Because a 
finding of overbreadth facially invalidates a statute, the Court has “recognized that the overbreadth 
doctrine is ‘strong medicine’ and have employed it with hesitation, and then ‘only as a last 
resort.’” Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 (citations omitted). A statute will not be overbroad merely 
because “it is possible to conceive of [an] impermissible application.” Broadrick. 413 U.S. at 630. 
Rather, a statute’s overbreadth “must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to 
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick. 413 U.S. at 613.
To the extent that the CPPA implicates the overbreadth doctrine, two arguments are 
offered. First, the CPPA might criminalize possession of non-obscene adult pornography 
protected by the First Amendment. Second, the CPPA might criminalize possession of non- 
pomographic works that nevertheless portray children in an erotic light, such as cartoons, 
drawings, and paintings. Furthermore, to the extent that impermissible applications of the CPPA
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may occasionally arise, they are insubstantial “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep ” Id
A. The Challenged Provisions Do Not Apply to Speech Protected by the First
Amendment.
1- The CPPA provides statutory safeguards that preclude conviction for
production, distribution, and possession of non-obscene adult pornography
The CPPA ensures that its application will not extend to constitutionally protected adult 
pornography. Respondents contend, however, that the challenged provisions, “appears to be” and 
“conveys the impression,” allegedly capture protected adult pornography containing youthful 
looking actors. The problem is overstated for two reasons.
First, the CPPA provides an affirmative defense and safe-harbor provision for violation of 
its terms. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(c) and 2252A(d). The affirmative defense applies to production 
and distribution of child pornography. Id To the extent that the statute implicates constitutionally 
protected adult pornography, the CPPA precludes a finding of guilt where the alleged child 
pornography was made with an adult subject and was not pandered as child pornography.
Similarly, the safe-harbor provision precludes conviction for possession of child pornography so 
long as the accused quickly destroyed the depictions or reported them to the proper authorities. Id^ 
§ 2252A(d) The public is protected from the alleged “overbreadth” of the CPPA if the materials 
they sell, distribute, or possess are not child pornography.
Second, the CPPA contains a scienter element that further mitigates the chance of unfair 
prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). To satisfy the scienter element, the prosecution must 
prove that the defendant knowingly received sexually explicit depictions of those who “appear[] to 
be” minors. Id. § 2256(8)(B). This scienter requirement applies to both the age of the subject as 
well as to the nature of the materials. ^ X-Citement Video. 513 U.S. at 78 (1994).
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The burden of satisfying the scienter requirement limits the scope of the statute. 
Prosecutorial efficiency ensures that the vast majority of prosecutions \vill be images of subjects 
who obviously appear to be under the age of eighteen - pre>pubescent children. Any claim that 
conviction for possession of sexually explicit material of adults who look like or dress in a 
youthful manner is “‘overstated’ in light of Congress’s determination that purveyors of child 
pornography usually cater to pedophiles, who by definition have a predilection for pre-pubescent 
children.” Fox, 248 F.3d at 404 (citing Hilton. 267 F.3d at 73-74).
Respondents contend that language in Ferber supports the permissibility of using youthful 
looking adult actors or simulations to portray minors. 458 U.S. at 762-63. In Ferber. the Court 
stated in dicta that in order to portray a child in an erotic light, “a person over the statutory age 
who perhaps looked younger could be utilized.” Id, The Court also suggests the use of 
“simulations.” Id Under this theory, the contested provisions unconstitutionally criminalize what 
should otherwise be considered adult pornography - pornography containing adult actors. This 
misinterprets the Court’s reasoning.
A common maxim of textual interpretation states that inclusion of one is exclusion of 
others. Karl Llewelyn, Remarks on the Theory of App. Dec, and the Rules or Canons about How 
Stat. are to be Construed. 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 397 (1950). Here, the Court specifically limited 
the above example to depictions that have literary, artistic, scientific, or educational value. Ferber. 
458 U.S. at 762-63. The Court did not, however, offer the suggestion that adult actors who look 
like children or simulations of children should be available for use in works pandered as child 
pornography, which has de minimis value. Such an example would have been most appropriate, as 
the matter before the Court involved child pornography. Had the Court offered no suggestion 
about youthful adult actors or simulations, then any limitation based on Ferber would have been
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purely speculative. By offering this suggestion, the reasonable conclusion is that the use of 
youthful adult actors or simulations is limited to works not considered child pornography.
2. Properly construed, the CPPA only applies to visual depictions “virtually
indistinguishable” from child pornography.
Because works in mediums not typically considered child pornography, for instance, 
cartoons, drawings, and paintings, are easily distinguishable from child pornography, the CPPA 
will not apply. Respondents contend, however, that the challenged provisions will capture works 
these types of works if they depict a subject in an erotic light who “appears to be” a minor. Under 
this theory, creation, distribution, and possession of a nude portrait of a young girl is criminalized 
under the CPPA. But because this visual depiction is easily distinguishable from real child 
pornography, properly construed, the statute will not apply.
A statute should be construed to avoid constitutional problems. Miller v. French. 540 U.S. 
327, 347 (2000). So long as the text is reasonably susceptible to the proffered interpretation, 
“every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality.” Hooper v. Cal, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895). Furthermore, where Congress has 
made its intent clear, “we must give effect to that intent.” Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson. 370 
U.S. 195,215(1962).
Here, Respondents’ interpretation of the challenged provisions does not avoid the 
constitutional problem. Assuming that cartoons, drawings, and paintings deserve full 
constitutional protection, then the statute does not reach these depictions beeause they are not 
confused with depictions of actual children. Congress’s intent in this situation is clear. “The 
appears to be language applies to the same type of photographic image already prohibited, but 
which does not require the use of an actual minor in its production.” Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 21. To
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avoid the constitutional problem and to further congressional intent, “appears to be” should be 
interpreted as “virtually indistinguishable,”
B. Facial Invalidation of the CPPA Is Unwarranted Where the Contested Provisions
Apply to Narrow Instances of Speech Relative to the Legitimate Sweep of the
Statute.
As with the doctrine of vagueness,^ the potential for overbreadth occurs in narrow 
situations. While there exists a broad range of pornographic material, under the CPPA, only 
pornographic depictions of minors are prohibited. Under Miller, any adult pornography that is 
obscene is prohibited. There then exists a category of child pornography that should it have 
portrayed legal adults instead of children, and was not obscene, it would be protected speech.
Only those instances where the depicted subject is arguably either a child or an adult do 
overbreadth concerns arise. These instances will be rare given the fact that the majority of the 
child pornography market is directed towards to the most substantial concern of pre-pubescent 
child pornography. Fox, 248 F.3d at 404 (citing Hilton, 267 F.3d at 73-74).
Furthermore, visual depictions that portray children in an erotic light are not captured by 
the statute. The Ferber Court dismissed this concern in considering whether “National Geographic 
pictorials” or “medical textbooks” might fall prey to the statute. 458 U.S. at 773. Conceding that 
these would be impermissible applications of the statute, the Court gave three reasons why this 
situation does not raise substantial overbreadth concerns. First, law enforcement officers are 
unlikely to give such an expansive reading of the statute. Id Second, these types of applications 
will represent only a tiny fraction of the proscribed conduct. Id Third, whatever overbreadth does 




Here, the same concerns are at issue. There is always the possibility that the CPPA will be
applied contrary to its intent, but these instances will be rare. To the extent that the overbreadth
doctrine is implicated in a very narrow range of situations, and taking into account the “plainly
legitimate sweep” of the CPPA, invalidation of the statute’s terms is wholly unwarranted.
I. THE CPPA IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS BECAUSE IT PUTS A REASONABLE 
PERSON ON NOTICE OF THE PROSCRIBED CONDUCT AND DISCOURAGES 
ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT OF ITS PROVISIONS.
The Constitution guarantees that enforcement of a federal statute is forbidden absent “due 
process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. V. Due process requires voiding a criminal statute where its 
prohibitions are vague, i.e., defined with insufficient clarity. Gravned v. Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 
108 (1972). A statute is not void for vagueness, however, when it puts a reasonable person on 
notice as to the prohibited conduct and avoids arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of its 
provisions. Posters N' Things v. U S.. 511 U S. 513, 525(1994) (citations omitted) Where a 
statute “abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the 
exercise of freedoms.” Gravned. 408 U.S. at 109. Vagueness concerns are most relevant in the 
“sensitive areas of speech vital to the free exposition of ideas.” See R.A.V. v. St. Paul. 505 U.S. 
377, 383 (1992). Sexually explicit images falling close to the line separating adult pornography 
and unprotected child pornography fall outside of this area. Acheson. 195 F.3d at 652.
This Court has set forth what is required of child pornography legislation. Ferber. 458 U.S. 
at 764. First, the prohibited conduct must be adequately defined. Id Second, the statute should 
suitably limit and describe the category of forbidden sexual conduct. Id Third, the scope of the 
legislation should be limited to visual depictions of children below a specific age. Id
The CPPA satisfies these requirements. The statute adequately defines the terms minor, 
sexually explicit conduct, producing, organization, visual depiction, computer, custody or control, 
identifiable minor. S^ 18 U.S.C. § 2256. The CPPA also clearly defines child pornography that
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depicts an actual minor. Id § 2256(8)(A). The CPPA suitably limits and describes the scope of 
the forbidden sexual conduct. Id. § 2256(8)(2) Here, the vagueness doctrine is not implicated. 
Respondents do allege that the challenged provisions render the CPPA impermissibly vague 
because the statute is not limited to children below a specific age, but rather to depictions that 
portray a subject who “appears to be” a minor. The challenged provisions, however, do not render 
the statute unconstitutionally vague because they provide adequate notice of the proscribed 
conduct and discourage arbitrary enforcement of its provisions.
A. A Reasonable Person Is on Notice That Child Pornography Is Illegal Under the 
Terms of The CPPA.
1. The "appears to be” and “conveys the impression” provisions of the CPPA
are consistent with other laws by which a reasonable person is expected to
abide.
It is unremarkable in our system to ask a reasonable person to base his conduct on 
qualitative standards. See U S. v Petrillo. 332 U.S, 1,7-8(1947). A reasonable person has a duty 
to exercise his best judgment in situations where the line between legal and illegal conduct is thin. 
Id, In areas of sexual conduct, particularly where children are at danger, the law rightfully 
demands the highest level of discretion. See, e.g., Osborne. 495 U.S. at 129-40. Many laws 
require a citizen to evaluate, at the risk of liability, the propriety of his conduct. So long as the law 
connotes an objective standard by which a reasonable person can abide, these laws are not vague. 
Posters 'N' Things. 511 U.S. at 513.
Laws governing obscene speech are not vague, even where the standards require a 
qualitative evaluation. See X-Citement Video. 513 U.S. at 78-79. This Court accepted 
“lascivious” as a reasonable description of a type of speech prohibited by the CPPA. M, While 
determining the lasciviousness of speech does require a difficult evaluation on the part of the
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observer, the Court held that the use of this term to describe the prohibited conduct is 
constitutionally sound. Id.
Furthermore, this Court put forth a similarly difficult definition of obscenity. Miller. 413 
U.S. at 17-18. Under the Miller test, obscene speech (1) appeals to the prurient interest of the 
average person: (2) is patently offensive in light of community standards: and (3) lacks any 
redeeming social value. Id. At least five terms (underscored) raise the same issues as the 
contested CPPA terms. By putting forth this non-statutoiy standard, the Miller Court indicated the 
high level of discretion expected of a reasonable person in matters of sexuality. Id
While the statute in Ferber specifically applied to children under the age of eighteen, the 
case lends support to the permissibility of the “appears to be” standard. 458 U.S. at 764 n. 17. The 
Court explained that the type of offense addressed by the statute must be limited to visual 
depictions of sexual conduct by children. Id at 764. The Court then noted that Illinois and 
Nebraska defined a child as under sixteen or “who appears as a pre-pubescent.” Id at n. 17 
Similarly, Indiana defines a child as “one who is or appears to be under [sixteen] ” Id The Ferber 
Court did not take issue with these definitions of children with respect to child pornography 
legislation.
Even statutory rape laws indicate the high level of discretion required of a reasonable 
person. The typical statutory rape law - imposing penalties for sexual relations with a minor - is 
not vague, and an individual is not liable for having sex with a non-minor who “appears to be” a 
minor. What is noteworthy, however, is that under most statutory rape laws, even where a victim 
falsely claims to be a non-minor, sexual relations with this minor is a strict liability offense.
Despite the difficulty in determining the difference between a minor and non-minor, our laws 
mandate that this be done correctly. Even if the accused was intoxicated, deceived, or honestly 
mistaken, a reasonable person is expected to make correctly this evaluation. In protecting the well-
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being of minors, particularly in matters of sexuality, our laws demand that a reasonable person
exercise the highest levels of discretion. No more discretion is expected under the terms of the
CPPA than what the law demands in the examples presented above.
2. The CPPA applies only to visual depictions considered to be child 
pornography.
A reasonable interpretation of the CPPA mandates that its terms should only be applied to 
visual depictions that are indistinguishable from "actual” child pornography.’ A reasonable person 
will realize that the challenged provisions prevent the CPPA from extending into mediums such as 
cartoons, drawings, and paintings. Even without reference to the "virtually indistinguishable” 
language found in the legislative history, the subject of a cartoon, drawing, or painting, literally 
does not appear to be an actual minor.
Furthermore, the title and location of a statute can indicate its intended purpose. Osborne. 
495 U.S. at 104 (holding that the title of the statute at issue and its location in the “Sexual 
Offenses” chapter of the Ohio code provided adequate notice that possession of child pornography 
was proscribed); see also Llewelyn, 3 Vand. L. Rev. at 397. Here, the statute is entitled the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act. It is located among code sections that deal with all forms of child 
pornography. ^ 18 U.S.C. § 2256. A reasonable person is put on notice that that the statute 
regulates only child pornography. That which is not child pornography, e g., drawings, cartoons, 
or paintings, are not captured by the statute.
B. The CPPA Discourages Arbitrary and Discriminatory Application of its Terms bv 
Connoting an Objective Standard
Undoubtedly, applying the contested terms will be difficult in narrow situations. Hilton. 
167 F.3d at 75 (holding that the difficulty in determining the difference between a seventeen and
’ This argument is discussed with respect to the overbreadth doctrine and is discussed above in § 
III.A.2.
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eighteen year old does not render the CPPA void for vagueness). The mere observation that the 
purely physical differences between a minor and non-minor can be illusory should not render the 
statute void for vagueness. Id Nevertheless, Respondents contend that this difficulty necessarily 
leads to arbitrary enforcement of the statute. Over-zealous prosecutors and malicious law 
enforcement officials are a constant in our system. The CPPA, however, discourages prosecutors 
and law enforcement officials from applying the CPPA in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner
1. Law enforcement resources are focused on the most compelling problem -
combating pre-pubescent child porno2raphv.
Vagueness concerns arise only in a small number of cases. Id The CPPA prohibits all 
“visual depictions” of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). Only 
where the subject of the depiction is arguably mature enough to be an adult should we be 
concerned with the mere possibility of arbitrary enforcement of the CPPA. Facial invalidation of a 
statute is unwarranted by the mere fact that it is possible to conceive of an impermissible 
application. Broadrick. 413 U.S. at 630,
The most important policy underlying the CPPA is directed towards elimination of the pre- 
pubescent child pornography market. Sen. Rpt. 104-358, at 20-22. While the state maintains an 
interest in eliminating all forms of child pornography, the market for pre-pubescent child 
pornography is the most robust, most dangerous, and highlights Congress’s most obvious concerns 
in enacting the CPPA. Id By focusing prosecution on the pre-pubescent market, pornographers 
will be encouraged to use adult-looking actors in their works.
Fortunately, pre-pubescent child pornography falls most obviously within the terms of the 
statute. Time and resources will therefore be focused on this aspect of the child pornography 
problem. There is no vagueness problem when dealing with pre-pubescent child pornography, the 
widest and most important application of the statute. Instigators, panderers, and purveyors of pre-
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pubescent child pornography should not exceed the grasp of justice because on rare occasions, it 
will be difficult to determine whether a visual depiction “appears to be” or “conveys the 
impression” of a seventeen year-old engaged in lewd conduct.
2. The CPPA’s scienter requirement precludes conviction absent a
determination that a reasonable viewer would consider the depiction to be of
a minor.
A scienter requirement can mitigate a statute’s vagueness. Posters 'N* Things. 511 U.S. at 
513 (holding that statute prohibiting the sale of drug paraphernalia was not vague where the Court 
inferred a scienter requirement that the seller knew that the paraphernalia was likely to be used for 
drug use). Under the CPPA, the prosecution must also establish the element of scienter to obtain a 
conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The trier of fact must determine whether a reasonable 
viewer would consider the depiction at issue to be of a minor. Mento. 231 F.3d at 922. The 
determination is made based on the totality of the evidence. Id
First, the trier of fact might determine whether a reasonable viewer would consider the 
subject of the depiction a minor based on the purely physical characteristics. In cases of pre- 
pubescent child pornography, this is a simple matter. In cases where the subject is physically 
mature, other factors can be considered.
Second, several courts have observed that child pornography is often pandered in a self- 
evident way. Acheson. 195 F.3d at 652-53. While the mere physical features of the subject might 
suggest a child or adult, other evidence is more revealing. Titles of the computer files depicting 
child pornography often advertise the age (or apparent age) of the subjects of the works. Id 
(explaining that the file names of the images at issue suggested the age of the child, e g.,
11 rape.jbg, Rina&Dad.jpg, ! M6SUK.JPG). Even if the CPPA discourages future labeling of files 
in this manner, this is helpful as it will make it more difficult to advertise and communicate the 
works to child molesters.
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Third, the subject-matter of the work may also indicate if its intended purpose was to 
eroticize children. Lewd portrayals of children behaving as children - as school girls, choir boys, 
etc. - militate in favor of a finding of liability under the CPPA.
Child pornography is usually more than a picture of a naked child. It has context and it has 
purpose. Most of the time, the physical characteristics of the subject will provide enough evidence 
to determine whether he is a minor. In the more difficult situations, the context and purpose of the 
portrayal will often be clear. While it is possible to conceive of an impermissible application of 
the statute, these rare instances are not enough to justify voiding the statute for vagueness.
3. Judicial safeguards protect the accused from arbitrary enforcement of the
CPPA
Judicial and procedural safeguards will ensure that the CPPA is not applied arbitrarily.
These include the judges, rules of evidence, the presumption of innocence, the “guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt” burden of proof in criminal trials, the appeals process, and others. In the narrow 
situation where the material in question is plausibly a child or adult, and in the even more rare 
situation where there is no additional evidence to convince the jury one way or another of its 
ruling, the presumption of innocence should prevail. If it does not, the judge may overrule the 
decision, or it may be appealed. As a consequence of claims brought under the CPPA for 
possession of virtual child pornography, precedent will be established, tests will be developed, 
helping to guide the jury in its role as trier of fact, Our system is capable of judiciously applying 
laws that ensure the safety of our children.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above. Petitioners urge this Court to REVERSE the decision of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and hold the challenged provisions “appears to be” and “conveys 
the impression” constitutional.
j
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